Chapter 10

How dangerous propaganda works

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Introduction

In our current era of political polarization, it is not uncommon to hear that 'one person's news is another's propaganda.' This impression is mistaken. Unlike the reporters of a free press, propagandists do not attempt to persuade with factual claims but spread vitriolic rhetoric or disinformation to manipulate others in ways that ultimately maintain or alter a balance of power for the propagandist's advantage.[1] A fundamental characteristic of propaganda, regardless of its cultural manifestation, is the author's intention to manipulate others. The problem is identifying a propagandist's intentions, which is mired in epistemic challenges, since most propagandists rely on cultural idioms or coded language and deny their original intentions post hoc. It is understandable, then, that prosecutors in speech crime trials would prefer to focus less on the mind of the propagandist and more on the consequences of his or her words – that is, the 'imminent lawlessness' of the propaganda rather than the intentions behind it.[2]

Does this mean that propaganda is dangerous only when it results in lawlessness? Many judges in the United States have more or less said yes.[3] Basing propaganda's threat on consequence alone, however, is less supported in international criminal law, where speech crimes have received much attention over the last decade.[4] For many legal theorists, a propagandist's words become dangerous not because of any direct or linear effects they have on perpetrators but because of the way they function within a cultural context and reveal the violent intentions of the author and audience.[5] Though a subtle difference from cause-and-effect analysis, the core idea here is this: Audiences are not automatons, and propaganda rarely causes anyone to behave one way or another, but it does bear collective intentionality to change social relations, making violence against particular groups more acceptable, on which perpetrators then act.

The purpose of this chapter is to defend the above claim by drawing from three topics. The first is speech act theory.[6] Since John Austin's *How to Do Things with Words*, speech has been analyzed as having three aspects:

- Locution: what is said by a speaker.
- Illocution: what is intended by the speaker.
- Perlocution: what is experienced by the audience.[7]

Critically, a speaker's illocution indicates an intended change in the world with respect to an audience. For instance, an assertion, directive, commissive, expressive or declarative all indicate different speaker intentions and respective changes in social relations or the accepted social tenets of a community.[8] Equally as critical, a speech act cannot function without certain felicity conditions or contextual factors in place at the time of the utterance, which allow the speaker to achieve uptake. Uptake occurs when an audience understands the speaker's intended meaning and thus stands in a position to accept or reject it.

The second topic is social psychology or the scientific study of how persons influence and are influenced by others. Many of the discipline's most replicated studies examine how contextual social interactions alter people's cognition, emotions and behaviors, including circumstances that contribute to violence.[9] As such, social psychology is beneficial for understanding conditions in which persons are influenced by a speaker and are more likely to act on prejudices, if not perpetrate hostilities or aggression toward others.

The third topic is the body of propaganda of Vojislav Šešelj, a radical Serbian politician and notorious warmonger during the Yugoslav Wars.[10] Considering Šešelj's propaganda is a worthwhile case study, since the degree to which his words contributed to mass violence in the Yugoslav Wars remains an open question. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) acquitted him of instigating persecution in 2016,[11] while the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunal's (IRMCT) Appeals Chamber (AC) overturned his acquittal in 2018.[12] Thus, a looming question is just how dangerous were Šešelj's words in the context of wartime Serbia?

Unless we are careful, questions like this one step unsteadily toward the presumption that propaganda has direct and linear causal effects on an audience – a presumption that many scholars, including myself, have argued is problematic.[13] When attempting to understand the dangers of propaganda, we ask an epistemic question: How do we know if an instance of propaganda is dangerous? We get into trouble if we then ask: Did the propaganda *cause* violence? For this question presumes that propaganda is, first, dangerous only if it directly results in violence, and, second, deterministically influences others. Both assumptions are problematic because a propagandist who attempts to incite mass violence, such as genocide, commits an inchoate offense, meaning the speech act is dangerous regardless of its consequence; and there is little evidence that propaganda has an indomitable influence on would-be perpetrators.

To illustrate, consider an analogous question raised by the Trial Chamber (TC) of Jean-Paul Akayesu at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). They asked what proof is there for a 'possible causal link' between the statements of a propagandist and persons who engage in mass violence.[14] This begs the question that the relationship between propaganda and perpetrators is linear and easily demonstrable after the fact – an assumption that post hoc studies have shown is false. Post-conflict ethnographies reveal that propaganda's influence on perpetrators is subtle, indirect, distal, cumulative and circular.[15]

Moreover, after a decade of speech crime trials, demonstrating a 'possible causal link' with factual evidence has become more elusive than as once presumed, and revealed how faulty it is to believe that words have direct causal effects or that individuals perpetrate crimes like cogs in a machine.

I will not discuss from a legal standpoint how international courts should resolve the problem of proving when a propagandist causes violence. However, what I will say about propaganda may have some relevance for future cases from the vantage point of the cognitive and behavioral sciences. My goal is to show that by understanding how propaganda works, we can identify when it is dangerous.

Understanding dangerous propaganda

Propaganda is the systematic attempt to direct perception, cognition and behavior toward the intent of a propagandist; its most dangerous forms are those that intersect with hate media, which stigmatizes and demonizes an out-group.[16] An out-group is any recognizable civilian population considered 'other' relative to an in-group. Hate media occurs most frequently under a political regime with control over the marketplace of ideas.[17] Cross-culturally, hate media tends to use social expressions, disinformation (e.g., false news reports) and inflammatory speeches to glorify the in-group and justify mass violence against an out-group.[18] Mass violence is widely understood as the persecution of a recognizable civilian population, such as ethnic cleansing, or mass crimes, such as massacres, mass rape or genocide.[19]

Accordingly, dangerous propaganda (simply 'propaganda,' henceforth) occurs when a speaker (ab)uses mass media to foster hatred, support hostilities or encourage violence against an out-group.[20] As such, the speaker's communication can be analyzed as a speech act, where the content and manner of speech function to bring about a social change, as reflected in the speaker's intentions as well as the audience's uptake and subsequent actions. Additionally, the tripartite character of speech acts entails that propaganda is analyzable as having three aspects:

i A message P by speaker S at time $t1$ in context c.
ii The intention I of speaker S and uptake U of persons R in c at $t1$.
iii Actions Q of persons R at time $t2$ because of (i) and (ii).

The first is the *speech condition*, when a speaker with sociocultural or political authority and access to mass media conveys a distinct locution, namely, a message, whether spoken or written, to an audience. The message not only comprises the locution but accompanies *performatives* – speaking styles, symbolic representations or nonverbal communication – giving the message a surface meaning and an implied meaning, which persons with cultural competence would grasp.[21] In this case, *context* is the cultural environment of the speaker and audience, while *time* is the period in which the speech act is communicated.

The second aspect is the *mental condition* – the point at which the intentions of the speaker and audience come into contact. For the speech act to be successful, the speaker's illocution must parallel the audience's uptake, meaning the audience understands the speaker's intended social change. An unsuccessful speech act results in a misfire, where the audience is unreceptive, noncommittal, or confused.[22] A successful speech act results in a joint construal of meaning, where the audience demonstrates a relevant social behavior in the cultural context, indicating their rejection or acceptance of the speaker's utterance. Acceptance is further demonstrated by the speaker and audience sharing in emotions, acceptances, beliefs or expectations, otherwise known as collective intentionality.[23]

The final aspect of speech is its *consequence*. These perlocutionary effects should not be restricted to the immediate cause and effect of the speech act but should be thought of as occurring 'because of' (i) and (ii). This means that the speech's consequence includes both first-order effects, such as the speech's immediate psychological impact on the audience, and second-order effects on the audience's actions soon thereafter, such as behaviors that reflect back on the speech. As Austin observed, a speech act has social force not only because of its immediate psychological force but also because of the collective behaviors that result from the social changes induced by the speech act.[24]

This is a subtle point that requires reflection. Consider the speech act of declaring a couple married. Under the right felicity conditions, the result is not limited to the immediate psychological change in the couple. Rather, it includes an array of subsequent events, ranging from the commencing honeymoon to numerous socially sanctioned actions that occur because of the speech act. The same is true for what Searle calls 'institutional facts,' where an act of speech act can alter an entire community's behavior, whether it is immediate or long after the speech.[25] A declaration of war, for instance, when uttered by a recognized authority figure in the proper context can change the actions of a society, redirecting people from a peacetime to a wartime orientation.[26] Propaganda is similar. When a propagandist claims that an out-group is an existential threat and the in-group understands the speaker's intention to exclude the out-group, the consequences are not limited to the immediate context. Instead, they encompass the actions taken by the in-group at later times, provided they are done because of the speech act.

Yet how do we know when an in-group's behaviors are done because of propaganda? First, when actions resemble those advocated by a propagandist. For instance, years before the Rwandan genocide, the November 1991 edition of *Kangura*, a Hutu-extremist magazine edited by Hassan Ngeze, who was one of the accused in the ICTR's 'Media Case,' depicted a machete on its cover, with the caption: "Which weapons are we going to use to beat the cockroaches for good?"[27] Years later, Matthias Ruzindana, a Rwandan linguist at the ICTR, explained that, for Hutu extremists, 'cockroaches' was an epithet for Tutsis, who were portrayed in Hutu propaganda as threatening pests that needed to be

exterminated.[28] Furthermore, *génocidaires* eventually used machetes to murder thousands of Tutsis as Ngeze intended, and thus reflected back on his propaganda. Second, perpetrator behavior resembles the propagandist's words. To illustrate, Predrag Dojčinović, a legal theorist and cognitive linguist, explains that an 'evidentiary feedback loop' often transpires with collective intentionality, such that the receiver of a speech act rationalizes the act promoted by the speaker using the speaker's own words. This occurs when persons from the in-group repeat language used by the propagandist to rationalize military aggression, dismiss concern for an out-group, or justify mass violence.[29] In other words, persons behaved in certain ways 'because of' the propaganda.

The speech condition: the context of Šešelj's speeches

Before focusing on the meaning or consequence of Šešelj's speeches, it is necessary to understand the context in which he gave them, namely, the rise of ultranationalism during the breakup of Yugoslavia. As a post-socialist political movement, Serbian ultranationalism centered on an irredentist ideology of uniting Serbs around an ethnoreligious identity: sharing an ethnic ancestry and supporting the reemerging nation and Orthodox Church.[30] The movement took shape in 1987, when Slobodan Milošević broke with socialists and declared his unequivocal support for Serbs in Kosovo and arguably began to wane after from 1991 to 2001, with the public ousting of Milošević. Throughout this period, Šešelj acted as a de facto ultranationalist propagandist and gave numerous inflammatory speeches that exploited three critical background conditions that appear to influence propaganda's effects on a population.[31]

Rising insecurities

The first background condition was socioeconomic insecurity. From 1980 to 1986, an economic crisis caused falling living standards for most Yugoslavs. Unemployment increased from 6 percent to 37 percent and coincided with a youth bulge, where persons under 25 experienced upward of 60 percent unemployment.[32] Economic distress, alongside perpetual bureaucratic gridlock, led to extensive social unrest, and eventually to a constitutional crisis between Serbian leaders and neighboring republics about the right to self-determination. While leaders in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo interpreted self-determination in Yugoslavia's 1971 Constitution as guaranteeing the right to independence, Serbian leaders disagreed and considered succession as unconstitutional.[33]

Numerous psychological studies demonstrate that as economic and social well-being plummet, so too does political trust.[34] In turn, political distrust engenders profound societal changes such as revivals, regime changes, or revolutions.[35] In

Serbia, political mistrust brought about a renaissance in ethnonationalism: the view that Serbian politics should no longer center on supporting so-called socialist brethren but defending Serbians exclusively. This view grew in popularity after Muslim Albanians and Croats demanded autonomy in Kosovo and Croatia, respectively.[36] For most Serbs, an autonomous, Muslim-controlled Kosovo meant losing their sacred heartland, while an independent Croatia raised fears about a return of fascism in the Balkans. Serbian ultranationalist exploited these fears to gain political support, comparing their opposition to Croatian fascism and Muslim extremism to the patriotism of Serbs at the 1389 Battle of Kosovo and rallying Serbs around a shared and threatened ethnonational identity.

Taken together, insecurities in the 1980s led to a revival in ethnonationalism, as evidenced by numerous religious or nationalistic rallies by the early 1990s, when many Serbs experienced visceral feelings of oneness with their ethnonation.[37] This is significant because psychological studies demonstrate that individuals whose personal identities are psychologically fused with their in-group, and feel threatened by an out-group, are more willing than others to engage in collective action for the in-group.[38] When this happens, a reciprocal existence is shared with one's in-group, such that one is strong whenever the in-group is strong, and likewise threatened if the in-group is threatened. As a result, a fused individual is often willing to sacrifice – even his or her life if not the lives of others – for the sake of the in-group. Hence, the threshold for Šešelj to drive 'fused' Serbs toward conflict would have been considerably lowered by the start of the Yugoslav Wars in 1991.

Control of the media

The second condition was giving speeches in a controlled media environment. From 1989 to 1990, Milošević undertook what he called an *anti-bureaucratic revolution*, encouraging a populist revolt with the goal of replacing non-Serbian officials in the Yugoslavian bureaucracy with Serbs. After sweeping across Serbia, Milošević's anti-bureaucratic revolution placed a majority of ultranationalists in office. Milošević then undertook three acts that secured his hold over Serbia until his arrest in 2001. He dismissed non-Serbs from the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and turned Yugoslavia's Secret police into his own personal army.[39] He then took control of Yugoslavia's national bank and transferred 2.5 billion Deutschmarks (equivalent to 1.5 billion dollars) into the pockets of his regime.[40] Finally, he purged thousands of journalists from Yugoslavia's media outlets and replaced them with Serbian ultranationalists.[41]

Consequentially, when Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina sought independence, the Milošević regime was able to propagate misinformation about neighboring republics. The Serbian media thus became inundated on a daily basis with false news reports and alleged conspiracies about non-Serbs, ranging from fabricated atrocity stories to an alleged Vatican-Tehran conspiracy to destroy the Serbian people.[42] Such misinformation reinforced a *big lie* that ultranationalists

repeated throughout the wars – that Serbs must defend themselves and their lands because they could not survive among non-Serbs.

In terms of linguistic context, Milošević's controlled-media provided the right felicity conditions for Šešelj's inflammatory speeches. The daily barrage of misinformation about threatening neighbors would have prepared Serbian audiences to believe authority figures, such as Šešelj, who called on Serbs to defend the nation. Additionally, mere exposure to violent content, such as images of wartime victims in the daily news, would have increased support for aggressive self-defense.[43] Experimental studies demonstrate that exposure to violent images reinforce cognitive scripts for using aggression to manage social situations.[44] Cognitive neuroscience further demonstrates that exposure to violent media induces long-term potentiation (LTP) in neural pathways for desensitization.[45] The most common response, however, to threatening media is moral panic: a community-wide fear about an imminent evil that must be dealt with. According to criminologist John Scott, moral panic typically occurs in a social context where political entrepreneurs are attempting to influence the political marketplace of ideas by exaggerating societal threats.[46] Doing so allows them to gain public support and extract resources from the community to deal with the alleged threat. However, when the threat is associated with a recognizable out-group, moral panic often engenders out-group violence, such as mobs or witch hunts, on which political entrepreneurs capitalize for personal gain, usually by extracting resources from a minority and using violence to intimidate political rivals.

This description bears an uncanny resemblance to the way Serbian ultranationalists used the media. Media sociologist Renaud de la Brosse, an expert witness in the ICTY's Milošević trial, has written that Serbian ultranationalists created a hyper-controlled media environment in the 1990s to disguise their warmongering as a necessary defense of the Serbian nation.[47] Under Milošević, Serbian journalists went so far as to air footage of innocent victims killed by Serbian forces, while claiming that they were Serbian victims killed by genocidal Croats or Muslims. Ultranationalists also used the media to obfuscate their own war profiteering and divert attention away from the ensuing mob-like culture enjoyed by Serbian warlords, while most of Serbia was going bankrupt.[48] In such an environment, Šešelj's speeches, which today appear bombastic threats about non-Serbs, would have been believable.

Manipulating preexisting culture

The third condition is manipulating preexisting cultural ideas, such as symbols, myths or folklore, to make radical ideas appear consistent, traditional and even patriotic. In effect, propagandists package new wine in old bottles; that is what Serbian ultranationalists did to justify their wartime efforts.

Ultranationalists twisted the Battle of Kosovo myth to advance a narrative about the nation itself being messianic and destined for rebirth, otherwise known

as messianic nationalism.[49] This narrative included the ultranationalist claim that Serbs not only were defenders of Europe but were chosen by God, akin to the Hebrews. Ultranationalists manipulated the historical traumas suffered by Serbs, including Ottoman occupation and genocide under Croatian Ustasha in the Second World War, to advance the narrative of Serbian innocent victimhood. Summarizing this narrative, Serbian anthropologist Marko Živković says it is "an exaggerated, larger-than-life, megalomaniacal story."[50] It claims that Serbs became the 'heavenly people' after choosing the kingdom of heaven over an earthly kingdom at the Battle of Kosovo, but have since suffered worldly evils in their inevitable defense of what is good and right. Building on his narrative, ultranationalists portrayed Serbs as inherently innocent victims, while Muslims and Croats were the epitome of evil, as evidenced by historical events.

These narratives are highly relevant for understanding the possible effects of Šešelj's speeches. The psychology of mass violence finds that believing one's in-group is inherently innocent and a perpetual victim of persecution by an out-group, who serves as an historical enemy, often precedes the persecution of that very out-group. This phenomenon is known as 'accusation in a mirror' and is a common predecessor to atrocity.[51] For example, anthropologist Alex Hinton found that genocides are usually preceded by collective narratives of unresolved in-group grievances over historical injustices and generational fears about perennial victimization. Likewise, historian Mahmood Mamdani finds that victimhood narratives, if manipulated by leaders, engender a victim-turned-killer mentality, in which genuine out-group threats set off an agenda of radical self-defense.[52] Serbia faced a similar situation at the outset of the Yugoslav Wars, in which the breakup of Yugoslavia appeared to shatter the interethnic peace of the republic. When Serbian ultranationalists portrayed Serbia as surrounded by historic enemies but destined for rebirth, they likely manipulated many Serbs into feeling as perennial victims and justified in the aggressive self-defense of their nation.

The mental condition: Šešelj's intentions and audience uptake

Let us now consider Šešelj's dangerous intentions. To demonstrate this, my discussion will weave together several aspects of the legal case against Šešelj and the cultural authority he wielded as a leader of Chetnik paramilitary formations. In so doing, it will become evident that Šešelj's messages were intended to encourage Chetniks in particular to commit mass violence and that audiences registered his intentions with signs of uptake.

Šešelj's power and authority

In his own defense at the ICTY, Šešelj described his propaganda campaign as 'boosting morale,' even though he repeatedly stressed (1) the genocidal intent

of Croats and Muslims, (2) the necessity of defending a Greater Serbia and (3) the need for a Serbian state.[53] For Šešelj, his speeches were delivered in places where the ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs occurred soon after, but he did not intend for violence or for his words to have influenced perpetrators. Remarkably, the TC agreed with this line of reasoning, which contributed to Šešelj's 2016 acquittal.

Nevertheless, in 2018, the IRMCT, found Šešelj guilty of instigating persecution in the form of ethnically cleansing Croats, based on a single speech he gave at an ultranationalist rally in the village of Hrtkovci, Vojvodina.[54] On 6 May 1992, hundreds of Serbian radicals and Chetniks converged on Hrtkovci, where Šešelj delivered an inflammatory speech. Drawing on Serbian fears and disinformation in Milošević's controlled media, Šešelj accused Croats of horrific crimes against Serbs, called for the expulsion of Croats from Serbia, and even read aloud the names of individual Croats who lived in Hrtkovci. In its judgment, the AC summarized the speech and its consequences as follows:

> Mr. Šešelj addressed his 'Serbian brothers and sisters,' declaring, among other things, that 'there was no room for Croats in Hrtkovci,' and that 'we will drive them to the border of Serbian territory, and they can walk on from there, if they do not leave before of their own accord.' He directly addressed Croats by telling them 'you have nowhere to return to' and ended his speech by stating: 'I firmly believe that you, Serbs from Hrtkovci and other villages around here, will also know how to preserve your harmony and unity, that you will promptly get rid of the remaining Croats in your village and the surrounding villages.' Following Mr. Šešelj's speech, the crowd chanted slogans such as 'Croats, go to Croatia,' and 'This is Serbia.'[55]

What the AC omitted was that Šešelj referred to local Croats as 'Ustasha,' and thus portrayed them Nazi perpetrators or sympathizers in persecuting Serbs. Within days of Šešelj's speech, 722 Croats fled Hrtkovci or were forced out by threats of violence from squads of Chetniks or by fraudulent housing transfers countenanced by local authorities. Given the parallel between these actions and Šešelj's inflammatory message, the AC concluded that they occurred because of Šešelj's speech, and thus he was responsible for instigating the crime of persecution.

It deserves mentioning that Šešelj's Hrtkovci speech was the only message for which he was convicted. Does this mean, then, that Šešelj's other speeches were not dangerous – or, as Šešelj himself claimed, were intended to boost morale, without any influence on perpetrators? If we consider Šešelj's overall propaganda campaign as it connected to Serbia's Chetnik subculture, it becomes evident that Šešelj intended to instigate far more violence than the AC was able to recognize.

The chief reason is that Šešelj was a powerful political figure with considerable influence over ultranationalists Serbs. By 1991, Šešelj was reputed for defending

Serbian nationalism throughout the 1980s, despite opposition from communist authorities. Most critically, Šešelj was the unequivocal leader of Serbia's ultranationalist front in 1989, when Momčilo Đujić, a former Orthodox priest and then highest-ranking living Chetnik *Vojvoda*, bestowed on Šešelj the title Chetnik Vojvoda or Duke, equivalent to Chief War Lord of the Serbs.[56]

Understanding the significance of Šešelj's official position requires some knowledge of Chetniks, a militant subculture of Serbia. From 1945 to 1989, the Chetniks – a self-proclaimed network of Serbian freedom fighters – were driven underground by Tito and fellow communist, who outlawed various forms of ultranationalism.[57] Before then, the Chetniks were a significant military force in the Balkans. Originating in the Balkan Wars, the Chetniks were guerilla forces who eventually formalized their political aspirations in the Second World War under Draža Mihailović, a Serbian general, who organized an armed resistance to defend Serbia from the Axis Powers. Their ultranationalist ideology, which would later rival Tito's communism, centered on three goals: (1) restore the Serbian Kingdom, (2) defend Serbian freedom and (3) terrorize Serbia's enemies.[58]

Since the movement's inception, *restoring the kingdom* has meant reinstating the Serbian monarchy and reclaiming what Chetniks perceive as Serbia's rightful homelands. These include a swathe of Balkan territories once held by Serbia's medieval kingdom, and granted to Serbia by the 1915 Treaty of London, a secretly signed treaty, when the Triple *Entente* promised Serbs an expanded territorial state for their alliance in the First World War.[59] In the 1990s, when Chetniks reemerged politically, Šešelj coined a specific phrase to signify this territory, which included South Croatia, the Dalmatian Coast, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. This phrase, which is notorious for its evocations among ultranationalists, is the *Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica* (KOKV) line. This linguistic expression demarcated, for Šešelj and ultranationalists, the territorial borders of an imagined Serbian state, otherwise known as 'Greater Serbia.'[60] The acquisition of this Serbian homeland – which became a goal of Serbian forces in the Yugoslav Wars – connects to the Chetnik notion of *freedom*, which has meant securing autonomy and protecting 'Serbian blood and Orthodox faith,' including resistance to any political or economic system that threatens Serbs.[61] From their inception in the Balkan wars, Chetniks used terror tactics, such as assassinations and ethnic cleansings, to terrorize their enemies into submission.

After being forced underground for nearly half a century, the Chetnik movement entered mainstream politics in the late 1980s, following Tito's death, the ensuing socioeconomic and political crises, and the impending collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. The surge in ultranationalism came when Serbian leaders, such as Šešelj, openly broke with communism, earning them an almost savior-like quality among Chetniks.[62] As Yugoslavia moved toward dissolution, Šešelj incorporated the Chetnik movement into the Serbian Radical Party (SRS),

and joined forces with Milošević, the president-elect of Serbia and later head of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).[63] By 1990, Šešelj was thus one of the most powerful political figures in Serbia, especially among Chetniks, ultranationalists and the far right.

Šešelj's intentions as ultranationalist leader

How can we infer a speaker's intentions? Based on pragmatics, if multiple audiences interpret speaker *S* as having intended message *G*, then it is likely that S intended G.[64] Though circular, this notion is a valid ethnographic inference in practice because meaning is jointly construed between the speaker and audiences who share a linguistic common ground. Therefore, intentions are derivable from not only what the speaker utters (and claims to have meant post hoc) but also audience uptake and the broader actions of the speaker that indicate his or her goals, plans or desires.

When it comes to Šešelj, two activities underscore his intent to bring about violence, and reveal that his post hoc defense of intending to boost morale is specious. First, Šešelj acted as the *de facto* propagandist for Serbian ultranationalism throughout the 1990s. He traveled to Serbian populations in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina where he propagated disinformation about an impending Serbian genocide; instructed communities to defend themselves against Croatian and Muslim neighbors; and recruited thousands of Chetnik volunteers for war.[65] Though Šešelj claims to have instructed Chetniks to comply with humanitarian law, most did not. In fact, his own personal unit, known colloquially as 'Šešeljevci' or Šešelj's Men, operated alongside the Serbian Volunteer Guard (SDG), headed by the Serbian warlord Željko Ražnatović aka Arkan, JNA, Army of Republika Srpska (VRS), and other Serb-led forces.[66] Wherever these units went, they left a wake of pillaging, ethnic cleansings, mass rape and massacres. Although Šešelj insists Chetniks were not under his command after recruitment, it must be stressed that they were still under his authority as Chetnik Vojvoda, a traditional military title of the supreme commander, who directed Chetnik units.

Second, Šešelj knew about the perpetration of mass violence and said nothing to deter it. Documents introduced at his trial showed that he was regularly informed about Chetnik military activities. Further, nearly all of his recruits used tactics that blatantly disregarded the Geneva Conventions, and appeared beset on conquering territory along the KOKV line – and this was likely intentional. For Serbian media at the time praised the combination of Šešelj's recruitment and Milošević's military tactics. The Belgrade Communist newspaper *Borba* (Struggle), for instance, concluded that, based on such coordination, "Milošević believes he now has the historic opportunity to once and for all settle accounts with the Croats and do what Serbian politicians after World War I did not – rally all Serbs in one Serbian State."[67] It is difficult to imagine that Šešelj advocated for

a Greater Serbia, recruited volunteers who violently pursued this goal, remained informed about their actions throughout the war, and yet did not understand the extent to which his volunteers engaged in war crimes.

Finally, evidence introduced by the ICTY indicated that many of Šešelj's recruits were ordered by unit commanders to engage in mass violence or lacked sound military hierarchies to report degenerative wartime conditions.[68] It is once again difficult to fathom how Šešelj could have lacked the foresight of mass crimes occurring. Sociologists of war have shown that mass violence is complex, rarely spontaneous, and typically designed by political elites to achieve their regime's goals.[69] Hence, Šešelj was too high-ranking among the Serbian elite to have not known about commanders ordering mass violence or should have had the foreseeability of criminal circumstances developing under the political and military chain of command.

Šešelj speaker-intention and audience uptake

Contrary to the legal case against him, Šešelj's intention to persecute non-Serbs, as reflected in his actions and speeches, was not isolated to Hrtkovci. For consider that Šešelj gave numerous speeches at ultranationalist rallies throughout the former Yugoslavia that resembled his Hrtkovci speech. Crucially, his speeches occurred at locations where months, weeks, and sometimes only days after he spoke, Serbian offenses launched attacks on civilian populations and, in many instances, committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. On these occasions, a cultural insider with knowledge of Chetnik subculture would have clearly discerned Šešelj's intentions and his audience's uptake.

For example, on 15 May 1991, just months before Serbia's war with Croatia, Šešelj traveled along what would become the Serbian frontline making inflammatory speeches and recruiting more combatants. At an ultranationalist rally in Borovo Selo, a Croatian village a few miles north of Vukovar, where a deadly siege and the infamous Ovčara massacre would take place (where hundreds of Croatian survivors of Vukovar were murdered), Šešelj gave a speech to gathered Chetniks, saying,

> We are sending a message to the new Ustasha head of state and Ustasha regime in Croatia: Serbian heads have rolled, struck down by the Ustasha hand in Serbian Krajina […] We will avenge Serbian blood![70]

In response, Šešelj's audience, shouted back, "We will!" Šešelj went on to say, in a telling narrative that then reflected his intentions:

> As far as we are concerned, the Croats can leave Yugoslavia any time they want, but we are letting them know openly that they will not take a single inch of Serbian territory, not a piece of land on which there are Serb villages, demolished churches, pits in which Serbs were butchered, Serbian

> camps, Serbian killing fields, such as a Jasenovac. Should we permit that, we would be unworthy of our glorious ancestors and shamed before our descendants. The Croats may create their new state but only to the west of the Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica line. Everything to the east of that line is Serbia.[71]

Now, Šešelj may claim in his defense that he was boosting morale here. But that would not explain the ensuing call and response between himself and his audience. Šešelj went on to say,

> Tuđman and the new Ustasha government in Croatia have again put the criminal *kama* [a knife used by Ustasha in the Second World War to kill Serbs] under the throat of the Serbian people […] We say to them we shall *take revenge* for each Serbian life and we shall also ask to pay up for past crimes. Also, for crimes in recent history. Nothing will remain unpunished and we will not allow the consequences of the occupation of the Serb lands and the Serb people.[72]
>
> (emphasis added)

At the end of Šešelj's speech, his mostly Chetnik audience began chanting "Revenge! Revenge! Revenge! (*Osveta! Osveta! Osveta!*)"

An outsider is likely to overlook numerous peripheral meanings in this speech. Most notable are Šešelj's equivocation between Franjo Tuđman, first democratically elected President of Croatian in 1990, and the Croatian people with the Ustasha, a military force reinstituted in Croatia under the Third Reich. The Ustasha are reviled today for enacting a practice to convert, ethnically cleanse, or annihilate Serbs and Jews from a Greater Croatia. While the Ustasha and Croats are by no means equivalent, the media under Milošević portrayed Tuđman's independent Croatia as a return to Ustasha-like fascism.[73] The Serbian media thus spread disinformation about Croats to debase them as modern-day Ustasha, and thereby heighten Serbian insecurities, notions of innocent-victimhood, and support for national rebirth. Building on these themes, Šešelj went one step further by advocating vengeance.

By knowing a bit about Chetnik culture, one can see why Šešelj's speech is a clear call to enact violence against Croats writ large. Like most of his speeches, Šešelj's Borovo Selo speech began by reiterating the threefold ideology of Chetniks and making claims to lands within the KOKV line. Such a trope signaled to his audience that his words should be interpreted within the frame of Chetnik ultranationalism. Šešelj then made his case for defending Serbian freedom by warning the crowd that Serbia was once again threatened by fascism in Croatia. He then rallied the attending Chetniks, telling the agitated crowd that they will "revenge Serbian blood." To which the crowd chanted "Revenge! Revenge! Revenge!"[74] This response is a sign of uptake. After all, Šešelj associates the Croatian threat with the defense of traditional Serbian lands and vengeance for

Serbian blood. Moreover, he insinuates that Chetniks would be shamed if they did not defend lands within the KOKV line and avenge Croatian victims, thus implying expulsion from Serbian territories or unilateral punishment for past crimes. When the audience chanted "revenge!" in response to Šešelj's speech, and Šešelj himself did not dispel it, it was a signal that he and the audience collectively intended mass violence against Croats.

The consequence: What happened because of Šešelj's speeches?

However, questionable Šešelj's knowledge and ultimate intentions remain, he held considerable influence over his followers. According to Balkan historian Yves Tomic, Šešelj was *the Vojvoda* – the unequivocal leader – for Chetniks, who revered and honored him.[75] Šešelj was also an unapologetic strongman with a great deal of charisma, and embodied an archetypal leadership quality, which many Serbs – and certainly Chetniks – have admired and followed. Taken together, Šešelj held much sway over his followers, a point emphasized by the ICTY prosecution, who described Šešelj in this way:

> We had insiders who talked about how powerful he [Vojislav Šešelj] was. How they looked up to him like he was a god. How his influence is evidenced by his popularity and the number of volunteers he was able to recruit, and the number of people who identified their group by using his name – the Šešeljevci.[76]

Possessing such influence is the most significant factor in getting others to perform actions that are otherwise considered immoral. Richard Wilson observes that Stanley Milgram's replicated shock-experiments show how most ordinary persons will abuse because of an authority figure's orders.[77] Given this, even if Šešelj hinted that followers should engage in mass violence – let alone encourage them to do so – they would have likely complied.

The parallel between Šešelj's speeches and the actions of his audiences reveal how influential he was as a propagandist. As an illustration, let us return to Šešelj's Borovo Selo speech and consider events that ensued soon thereafter in Vukovar, the first of many civilian populations sieged and terrorized by Serbian forces. Vukovar, a Croatian city a ten-minute drive south of Borovo Selo, was falsely portrayed by the Serbian media in 1991 as a stronghold for Croatian Ustasha.[78] Recall that during this time, Šešelj's Borovo Selo speech accused Croats of enacting fascism, thus encouraging Chetniks and Serbian ultranationalists that vengeance could be exercised against the Croatian city. As Serbian forces marched toward the city, the Serbian media and ultranationalist leaders depicted the Vukovar military operation as a *liberation* to stop, for instance, Ustasha from torturing Serbian children.[79] The truth was far different. A motley crew of Serbian forces, including the JNA and Serbian paramilitary forces, surrounded the

civilian city and shelled it for 87 days. After the city fell, the alleged Ustasha stronghold could not be found, but a Serbian reporter still defended the siege, telling Reuters, an international news agency, that he witnessed the discovery of 41 Serbian children, who had been tortured to death by Croats. Reuters, in determining the facts of the story, discovered that it was a rumor, stemming from earlier disinformation propagated in Serbian media – demonstrating the echo chamber of ultranationalist propaganda.[80] Nevertheless, in Serbian media, the story was reported as factual, alongside other reports that Croats were sacrificing children and killing adults to harvest their organs on the black market.

At the same time, Serbian forces secretly transferred 261 prisoners from Vukovar to a nearby farm in Ovčara, where they were tortured, executed, and buried in a mass grave. Years later, testimony would come to light at the ICTY that Serbian combatants at Ovčara, some of them members of Šešelj's Chetnik paramilitary units, justified their actions as vengeance for the alleged Serbian victims of Ustaša crimes.[81] These actions not only parallel the vengeance that Šešelj called for at Borovo Selo but also underscore the dangers of vengeful speech alongside disinformation such as atrocity stories.

Revenge looks like a powerful psychological motivator and contributor to collective violence. Biologist Michael McCullough has found that hominins, including humans, likely evolved to respond to injustices or threats of repeat offense with revenge.[82] Based on game theoretical evidence and the archeological record, McCullough demonstrates that revenge is likely an adaptive strategy to prevent individual or group exploitation and thus threats to survival and fitness.[83] Likewise, Richard Wilson and colleagues conducted experiments among US and Serbian populations, disguising nine of Šešelj's speeches – which were originally coded and used as evidence by sociologist and propaganda expert witness Anthony Oberschall at Šešelj's ICTY trial – as primes about a fictional country and an out-group.[84] After exposure to one of the speeches, participants then made a series of political decisions, including supporting violence against the population targeted in the speech. Across populations, Wilson and colleagues found that Šešelj's speeches on revenge contributed to support for violence and lack of empathy for the out-group.[85] Hence, Šešelj's calls for violence at Borovo Selo, months before the siege of Vukovar, were probably highly persuasive for Chetnik followers.

To further demonstrate the influence of Šešelj's speech, there is direct evidence of perpetrators using Šešelj's own words to justify mass violence enacted on the Vukovar population. Specifically, Šešelj's notion of defending Serbia and thereby cleansing it of non-Serbs within his so-called KOKV line. That linguistic phrase was directly echoed by perpetrators videotaped later in the war. For instance, after the fall of Vukovar in 1991, a drunken Serbian paramilitary fighter was filmed saying, "War will be over when we have our limits – Karlobag, Karlovac, Ogulin, Virovitica. All place(s) where Serbian people live must be free, you know. We must clean up with the Croats."[86] Dojčinović claims that the shared mental concepts in Šešelj's speeches and perpetrator reports, such as the above

paramilitary fighter's comments, are evidence of a 'mental fingerprint.'[87] That is, evidence that a perpetrator was influenced by a propagandist insofar as the perpetrator himself justifies his actions by repeating the language of a propagandist, which would not occur unless the language was influential.

Conclusion

A firm grasp of these three underlying concepts of speech are necessary if dangerous propaganda is to be understood. No study of language as a series of actions, and of the differences between the modes of speech that make action possible, is arguably more helpful than speech acts theory. By combining knowledge about speech acts and recent discoveries about the social motivations to accept or engage in mass violence, we can begin to understand when propaganda is most dangerous. I have tried to give a preliminary analysis of propaganda, including supporting evidence from the cognitive and behavioral sciences, that together allow us to identify when it is a social danger. I have argued that we cannot expect to judge accurately the dangers of propaganda by asking what immediately happened after (i) a message *P* by speaker *S* was uttered at time *t*1 in context *c*. We must go further by asking what were (ii) the intentions *I* of speak *S* and uptake *U* of persons *R* in *c* at *t*1 and what context-related cultural evidence is there for (iii) actions *Q* of persons *R* at time *t*2 because of (i) and (ii). To demonstrate this, I have drawn from my own ethnographic experience in the Balkans to analyze the propaganda of Vojislav Šešelj. It is my hope that the general formula I have provided can contribute to the work of other scholars interested in understanding or identifying forms of dangerous propaganda.

Notes

1 G. Jowett and V. O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, Seventh Edition, London: Sage, 2019, pp. 1–3.
2 This is the case for U.S. law, the precedent for which is based on Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). In international case law, the imminent lawlessness standard is based on Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze v. The Prosecutor, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, 28 November 2007.
3 In U.S. law, this was stated in Brandenburg (1969) and thereafter reinforced in Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973), N.A.A.C.P. v Claiborne Hardware Co., 485 U.S. 886 (1982), Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), U.S. v. Lee, N.W.2d 250 (1993), and U.S. v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (2012).
4 See S. Benesch, 'The Ghost of Causation in International Speech Crime Cases,' pp. 254–268; P. Dojčinović, 'Word Scene Investigations: Toward a Cognitive Linguistic Approach to The Criminal Analysis of Open Source Evidence in War Crimes Cases,' pp. 71–117; A. Oberschall, 'Propaganda, Hate Speech and Mass Killings,' pp. 171–200, all in P. Dojčinović (ed.), *Propaganda, War Crimes Trials and International Law: From Speakers' Corner to War Crimes*, Abingdon, New York, NY: Routledge, 2012. J. Leader Maynard and S. Benesch, 'Dangerous Speech and Dangerous Ideology: An Integrated Model for Monitoring and Prevention,' *Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal*, vol. 9, no. 3, 2016, pp. 70–95.

5 J. Kiper, 'Toward an Anthropology of War Propaganda,' *Political and Legal Anthropology Review*, vol. 38, no. 1, 2015, pp. 129–146. C. Mironko, 'The Effect of RTLM's Rhetoric of Ethnic Hatred in Rural Rwanda,' in A. Thompson (ed.), *The Media and the Rwandan Genocide*, London: Pluto Press, 2007, pp. 125–135. R.A. Wilson, *Incitement on Trial: Prosecuting International Speech Crimes*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. R.A. Wilson and J. Kiper, 'Brandenburg in an Era of Populism: Risk Analysis in the First Amendment, Law and Public Affairs' (in press).
6 J. Searle, *Speech Acts*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.
7 J.L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962.
8 Austin, *How to Do*, pp. 150–163. See also J. Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality*, New York, NY: Free Press, 1995, pp. 190–191.
9 A few of the most prominent studies are as follows: A. Bandura, 'Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities,' *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, vol. 3, no. 3, 1999, pp. 193–209. S. Milgram, *Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View*, New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1974. P. Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil*, New York, NY: Random House, 2007.
10 For a review, see A. Oberschall, *Vojislav Šešelj's Nationalist Propaganda*: *Contents*, *Techniques*, *Aims and Impacts*, *1990–1994*. Expert Report for the Office of the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 2006. The Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67, exhibit no. P00005.
11 The Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, Trial Judgment, Case No. IT-03-67-T, 31 March 2016 [hereinafter Šešelj TJ].
12 In Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, Appeal Judgment, Case No. MICT-16-99-A, 11 April 2018, para. 1138 [hereinafter Šešelj AJ] states that the judgment itself refers only to Šešelj's hate speech in the town of Hrtkovci, Serbia. Furthermore, the AC explains in paras 1154–1155 the specifics of this crime, stating,

> Based on the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber finds Seselj responsible, pursuant to Article 1 of the Mechanism's Statute and Articles 5(d), 5(h), 5(i) and 7(1) of the ICTY Statute, for instigating deportation, persecution (forcible displacement), and other inhumane acts (forcible transfer) as crimes against humanity.
>
> para. 1155

13 Benesch, 'The Ghost,' pp. 257–259; Kiper, 'Toward an Anthropology,' pp. 129–131; Wilson, *Incitement*, pp. 144–146.
14 Prosecutor v Jean Paul Akayesu, Trial Judgment Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998, para. 349 [hereinafter Akayesu TJ].
15 See, for example, A. Hinton, *Why Did They Kill? Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005. M. Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. Mironko, 'The Effect of RTLM's Rhetoric.'
16 Jowett and O'Donnell, *Propaganda*, p. 7.
17 Leader Maynard and Benesch, *Dangerous Speech*, pp. 77–79.
18 T. Kamilindi, 'Journalism in a Time of Hate Media,' in A. Thompson (ed.), *The Media*, pp. 136–144.
19 Oberschall, 'Propaganda,' pp. 182–185.
20 Dojčinović, *Word Scene Investigations*, pp. 4–5; Wilson, *Incitement*, p. 4.
21 J.R. Searle, 'How performatives work,' *Linguistics and Philosophy*, vol. 12, no. 5, 1989, p. 552.
22 Austin, *How to Do*, pp. 24, 76, 114.
23 J.R. Searle, 'Collective intentions and actions,' in P. Cohen, J. Morgan, and M.E. Pollack (eds), *Intentions in Communication*, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990, p. 401.
24 Austin, *How to Do*, p. 117.

25 Searle, *Construction*, p. 43.
26 Searle, *How Performatives Work*, p. 549.
27 Wilson, *Incitement*, p. 255.
28 M. Kimani, 'RTLM: The Medium That Became A Tool for Mass Murder," in Thompson (ed.), *The Media*, pp. 119–122.
29 Dojčinović, *Word Scene Investigations*, pp. 95–96.
30 S. Ramet, *Thinking about Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates about the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 149.
31 See Benesch, 'The Ghost,' pp. 262–264; Wilson, *Incitement*, p. 263.
32 P.B. Mieczyslaw, *Regime Change in the Yugoslav Succession States: Divergent Paths Toward a New Europe*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010, pp. 66–67.
33 D. Jović, *Yugoslavia: A State that Withered Away*, West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2009, pp. 32, 145, 179.
34 See R.J. Dalton, *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 12.
35 P. Norris, *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 26.
36 Jović, *Yugoslavia*, pp. 176–184.
37 P. Mojžes, 'Religion and the Yugoslav Wars (1991–1999),' in B. Radeljić and M. Topić (eds), *Religion in the Post-Yugoslav Context*, London: Lexington Books, 2015, pp. 1–16.
38 See R. Spears, 'Toward an Integrative Social Identity Model of Collective Action: A Quantitative Research Synthesis of Three Socio-Psychological Perspectives,' *Psychological Bulletin*, vol. 134, no. 4, 2008, p. 504.
39 M. Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 374.
40 J. Armatta, *Twilight of Impunity: The War Crimes Trial of Slobodan Milošević*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010, p. 128.
41 See I. Boljević, D. Odavić, V. Petrović, S. Rabrenović, B. Stanković, J.S. Janković, N. Vučo and D. Vukotić, *Reči i nedela: pozivanje ili podsticanje na ratne zločine medijima u Srbiji 1991–1992* (Words and Misdeeds: Calling for or Inciting War Crimes in the Serbian Media, 1991–1992), Beograd: Studija tužilaštva za ratne zločine Republike Srbije, 2011.
42 Ramet, *Thinking about Yugoslavia*, pp. 270–271.
43 See B. Bushman and C.A. Anderson, 'Comfortably Numb: Desensitizing Effects of Violent Media on Helping Others,' *Psychological Science*, vol. 20, no. 3, 2009, p. 273.
44 N. Carnagey, C.A. Anderson and B. Bartholow, 'Media Violence and Social Neuroscience,' *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, vol. 16, no. 4, 2007, pp. 180–181.
45 Ibid., pp. 180–181.
46 J. Scott, 'Moral Panic,' in J. Scott (ed.), *A Dictionary of Sociology*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 492.
47 R. de la Brosse, *Political Propaganda and the Plan to Create A 'State for All Serbs': Consequences of Using the Media for Ultra-Nationalist Ends*, Expert Report to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 2003.
48 Scott, 'Moral Panic.'
49 As cited in Ramet, *Thinking about Yugoslavia*, p. 149.
50 M. Živković, 'The Wish to Be a Jew: The Power of the Jewish Trope in the Yugoslav Conflict,' *Cahiers de l'URMIS*, vol. 15, no. 6, 2000, p. 249.
51 The basic idea of 'accusation in a mirror' is that propagandists 'impute to enemies exactly what they and their own party are planning to do.' A. Des Forges, *Leave*

None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 1999, p. 66. See also Akayesu TJ, para. 99. The Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze, Judgment and Sentence, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, 3 December 2003, para. 111.

52 Hinton, *Why Did They Kill?*.
53 Šešelj TJ, paras 56, 227, 230, 257, 275, 322, 331.
54 Šešelj AJ.
55 Ibid.
56 Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67, Third Amended Indictment, 7 December 2007, para 3.
57 J. Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1975, pp. 171–176.
58 Tomasevich, *War and Revolution*, pp. 256–261.
59 This issue was discussed at Šešelj's trial, where historian Yves Tomic demonstrated that the Treaty of London was unrelated to the territorial claims made by Šešelj, such as KOKV line, contrary to Šešelj's own rhetoric. See Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67, trial transcript, 29 January 2008, pp. 2929–2940. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/trans/en/080129ED.htm> (accessed 11 June 2019).
60 Dojčinović, *Word Scene Investigations*, p. 95.
61 Tomasevich, *War and Revolution*, pp. 256–261.
62 N. Cigar, *Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing*, College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1995, p. 201.
63 Ibid.
64 S. Croddy, 'Meaning and intention,' *Journal of Pragmatics*, vol. 12, no. 1, 1988, p. 1.
65 C. Bassiouni, 'Final Report on the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780,' United Nations Security Council Report, December 28, 1994.
66 R. Lukić and A. Lynch, *Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 190.
67 Bassiouni, 'Final Report.'
68 For example, see The Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Goran Hadžić, First Amended Indictment, Case No. IT-04-75-I, 22 July 2011. See also Wilson, *Incitement*, p. 117.
69 See Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy*.
70 Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67, trial transcript, 7 November 2007, p. 1799. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/trans/en/071107IT.htm> (accessed 11 June 2019).
71 Ibid., p. 1800.
72 Ibid., p. 1802.
73 Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Prosecution's Closing Brief, Case No. IT-03-67-T, 5 February 2012, paras 51, 122.
74 For 'revenge' rhetoric and its effects, see for example Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Prosecution's Closing Brief, 5 February 2012, paras 32, 54, 185, 460.
75 As cited in Wilson, *Incitement*, p. 116.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid., p. 227.
78 Boljević, *Reči i nedela*, pp. 388–393.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.icty.org/en/content/ljubica-došen> (accessed 12 May 2019).

82 See M. McCullough, *Beyond Revenge: The Evolution of the Forgiveness Instinct*, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2008.
83 Ibid., pp. 95–99.
84 C.M. Lillie, B. Knapp, L.T. Harris and R.A. Wilson, 'This Is the Hour of Revenge: The Psychology of Propaganda and Mass Atrocities,' 2015. Online. Available HTTP: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2580521> (accessed 11 June 2019).
85 Ibid.
86 As cited in Wilson, *Incitement*, p. 274.
87 Dojčinović, *Word Scene Investigations*, pp. 95–96.